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Rumors have been a part of politics since ancient Greece (Sunstein, 2014), helping to fuel popular 
revolutions and determine the fate of presidencies (Bartholomew & Hassall, 2015; Dunn, 1999). Political 
rumors—typically defined as pieces of political information that are circulated without verification, often 
outside official media channels (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007b; Weeks & Garrett, 2014)—can also be theorized 
as one dimension of everyday political talk. By discussing political rumors, citizens grapple with the 
uncertainty inherent in politics and work to shape their own views and build solidarity with others (DiFonzo 
& Bordia, 2007a; Edy & Risley-Baird, 2016; Margolin, Hannak, & Weber, 2018). Edy and Risley-Baird (2016) 
highlighted the social nature of rumors in their concept of “rumor communities,” which they used to describe 
the social networks that form among those who discuss rumors. 
 
As modern communication technologies have increased the reach and influence of political rumors 
(Garrett, 2011; Sunstein, 2014; Weeks & Garrett, 2014), they have also expanded opportunities for rumor 
communities to develop and thrive. In particular, instant messaging and mobile chat platforms present 
intriguing, but relatively unexplored, contexts for rumor communication. Popular instant messaging apps 
such as WhatsApp and WeChat create the type of closed social networks populated by primarily close ties 
with rich potential for political talk (see Kligler-Vilenchik, 2019) and circulation of misinformation (Rossini, 
Stromer-Galley, Baptista, & Veiga de Oliveira, 2020). Yet to date, little is known about how rumor 
communication on instant messaging platforms can influence users’ engagement in politics. Market research 
analysts estimate that the top three instant messaging platforms (WhatsApp, WeChat, and Facebook 
Messenger) have nearly 4 billion users internationally (“Global Social Media Ranking 2019,” 2019). 
Understanding the way these widely used communication technologies are amplifying or transforming the 
age-old practice of political rumoring has important implications for political systems around the globe. 
 
To help advance our understanding of rumor communication on instant messaging platforms, the 
present study examines the consequences of discussing political rumors on KakaoTalk, a popular South Korean 
instant messaging app that previous research indicates might help facilitate unique communities for political 
talk (Kligler-Vilenchik, 2019). In doing so, we emphasize the communicative dimensions of rumors and 
consider how talking about rumors on KakaoTalk might facilitate participation in and knowledge about political 
campaigns. Findings from our analyses of unique panel survey data—collected during the 2017 South Korean 
presidential election—offer three important insights into political rumoring on instant message platforms. 
 
First, we found that more than 20% of the respondents in our sample reported using KakaoTalk 
for political rumor communication, supporting the possibility that instant messaging apps such as KakaoTalk 
are contexts in which rumor communities can emerge (Edy & Risley-Baird, 2016). Second, we examined 
whether rumor communication on KakaoTalk was related to increases in political participation and political 
knowledge, two key dimensions of democratic citizenship. Although using KakaoTalk for rumor 
communication predicted increased participation in political campaigns, it did little to help respondents learn 
about the campaign. This highlights one way in which the use of communication technology for rumors may 
have distinctly negative consequences for democratic governance (Fowler & Margolis, 2014). Third, although 
the popular conception is that the rumors circulated on social media are a danger to the politically naïve, 
we found evidence that those with higher levels of political interest and more extreme ideological 
identification may be most influenced by political rumors on KakaoTalk. Ultimately, the present study 
suggests that rumor communication on instant messaging platforms, such as KakaoTalk, may serve to boost 
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participation among those who are already oriented toward politics (Edy & Risley-Baird, 2016; Weeks & 
Garrett, 2014), while doing little to deepen their political knowledge. 
 
Rumors and Political Talk 
 
At the outset, it is important to distinguish political rumors from “fake news,” dis-information, and 
propaganda, each of which has been heavily studied in the context of social media (see Tucker et al., 2018). 
Unlike these other types of misinformation, political rumors can vary in both truthfulness and intended effect 
on audiences. What typically defines political rumors is that they are circulated outside the journalistic 
verification process that produces mainstream news content (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007b; Weeks & Garrett, 
2014). Although rumors often do turn out to be untrue or maliciously spread, what distinguishes them is 
their lack of verification. 
 
Another crucial defining feature of rumors is that they are socially constructed. DiFonzo and Bordia 
(2007a) argue that when individuals encounter ambiguous or threatening situations, they often seek 
resolution by reaching out to others to make sense of things. Rumors arise as individuals generate, discuss, 
and scrutinize “informal hypotheses” about some aspect of the world that causes them psychological distress 
(DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007a). Crucially, this makes rumor inherently communicative. This aspect of rumors is 
highlighted by the emergence of “rumor communities,” within which people discuss rumors to achieve 
collective meaning making (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007a; Edy & Risley-Baird, 2016). 
 
Given this line of theorizing, the present study focuses explicitly on the communicative dimension of 
rumors. While many studies have examined how reception of rumors can lead to misperceptions or false beliefs 
(see Sunstein, 2014), we consider how the collective meaning-making process that motivates rumor 
communication might influence political knowledge and participation. Doing so helps us identify not only 
communication technologies that spread rumors (Margolin et al., 2018), but those that can facilitate more 
dialogic forms of rumor communication (Edy & Risley-Baird, 2016; Shin, Jian, Driscoll, & Bar, 2017). In the next 
section, we consider why instant messaging apps such as KakaoTalk are particularly well suited for this purpose. 
 
KakaoTalk as a Context for Political Rumors 
 
Research has established that the Internet and social media can serve as environments for effective 
rumor circulation (Rojecki & Meraz, 2014; Shin et al., 2017). We argue that instant messaging apps may 
offer particularly fertile ground for rumor communication for three reasons. First, instant messaging 
platforms are primarily used for informal interactions among close ties such as friends, family, and 
coworkers. Studies have found that information from close ties is often perceived as more trustworthy and 
believable, which may in turn help promote rumor transmission (Garrett, 2011). Second, many instant 
messaging apps have group messaging features, which can create the type of relational conditions ideal for 
political rumor communication. Group chats can facilitate “micro-networks” in which users develop intimacy 
and a sense of belonging (Jin & Yoon, 2016; Lee, 2011). This may help further cultivate the formation of 
rumor communities, in which social interaction is of sufficient quality to support meaningful political talk 
(Kligler-Vilenchik, 2019). Third, many instant messaging apps host closed networks, which afford users a 
greater degree of control over the visibility of their communication. Talking about rumors may be less 
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socially risky in closed networks than in open networks (e.g., Twitter), where users’ behavior is often visible 
to a large, mixed audience. On instant messaging platforms, discussion of rumors can occur without social 
observability concerns. Users may therefore perceive relatively lower social sanctions for discussing 
unverified information with others (Fine, 2007). Indeed, Rossini and associates (2020) found pervasive 
sharing of political misinformation on the mobile social media WhatsApp. 
 
South Korea presents an ideal national context for examining rumor communication on instant 
messaging platforms. Not only is South Korea an advanced democracy, but it also boasts one of the highest 
rates of mobile phone use in the world (Silver, 2019). Further, the circulation of rumors on instant messaging 
platforms has played a prominent role in contemporary South Korean politics (Mosler, Lee, & Kim, 2017). 
In this study, we focus specifically on KakaoTalk, one of the most popular mobile messaging platforms in 
South Korea. KakaoTalk enables not only person-to-person instant messaging, but also various types of 
group conversations. Ninety four percent of South Korean adults use group chats, and each user engages 
in an average of 6.5 group chats every day (Han, 2018). As the dominant mobile messenger in South Korea, 
KakaoTalk is the number one place where people encounter political rumors according to press reports (Oh 
& Park, 2017). The circulation of political rumors in KakaoTalk is especially prevalent during election seasons, 
when the private lives of politicians are put under immense scrutiny (Lee, 2011). This makes KakaoTalk not 
only an important site for studying Korean politics, but also an ideal context for testing more general 
predictions about how rumor communication on instant messaging platforms influences political knowledge 
and participation. 
 
Rumors and Political Participation 
 
Given that the present study focuses on the communicative dimensions of political rumors, it is 
important to first consider how more general forms of political talk are related to political participation. 
Research suggests that the frequency, setting, and nature of political discussion can all influence whether 
or not citizens volunteer for campaigns, attend rallies, or cast their votes (Kwak, Williams, Wang, & Lee, 
2005; Mutz, 2002). Various theoretical perspectives suggest that political talk can help individuals form 
considered opinions, build political solidarity, and become affectively engaged (Kim & Kim, 2008; Mutz, 
2006). Can talking about political rumors on KakaoTalk similarly encourage participation? 
 
Rumor communication in particular might be positively related to campaign participation for two 
main reasons. First, given the nature of close-tie, small-group-based communication on apps such as 
KakaoTalk, people are likely to encounter rumors that reinforce their existing political views. Individuals’ 
close social networks tend to consist mostly of people who share similar political attitudes and preferences 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Mutz, 2006). In the context of political rumors, Garrett (2011) 
found that rumors shared among family and friends via e-mail were disproportionately slanted toward 
people’s prior beliefs. One potential consequence of this attitude-consistent exposure is that it can 
strengthen political attitudes and reinforce political self-concepts (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009; 
Mutz, 2006; Sunstein, 2014). Because extreme attitudes are more cognitively accessible and serve as 
greater decision cues, attitude strength can have a strong impact on political behavior (Lavine, Borgida, & 
Sullivan, 2000). Indeed, research shows that exposure to attitude-reinforcing information can drive people 
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to participate in campaigns and elections (Dilliplane, 2011; Feezell, 2016). We therefore expect rumor 
communication on KakaoTalk to motivate people to participate in politics by reinforcing their political beliefs. 
 
Second, rumor communication may help build social and political solidarity. Individuals often 
intentionally produce and spread negative rumors about their adversaries to enhance the status of their 
group or to undermine opponents’ credibility (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007a). The social exchange of rumors can 
thus serve to communicate group norms and define group boundaries (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007a). Higher 
identification with in-groups can fuel collective action, such as voting and taking part in demonstrations, to 
protect the group’s welfare (e.g., Miller, Gurin, Gurin, & Malanchuk, 1981). Additionally, if people do 
encounter rumors intended to undermine their preferred candidates or disparage their closely held beliefs, 
they may experience motivating anger and thus take action (Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, 
& Hutchings, 2011). 
 
In spite of this research suggesting a positive relationship between rumor communication and 
political participation, there is also evidence supporting the opposite prediction; talking about rumors on 
KakaoTalk might discourage political participation. First, the dissemination of unverified and often deceptive 
claims may feed uncertainty regarding political candidates, which can lead to ambivalence among voters. 
Existing research shows that people who hold conflicting or ambivalent views are less likely to participate in 
campaign activities than those with clear preferences (Mutz, 2002; Nir, 2005). Second, unverified 
disparaging claims and scandalous allegations can create a climate in which politicians and politics are seen 
as long on “sleaze” and short on substance (Pattie & Johnston, 2001). The use of KakaoTalk for rumor 
communication may thus further damage public confidence and respect for political institutions, which is an 
essential condition for traditional political participation (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994). During 
elections, politically distrustful citizens may choose to abstain from participation altogether (Bélanger & 
Nadeau, 2005; Pattie & Johnston, 2001). It is thus plausible that political rumors may damage citizens’ trust 
and discourage participation in elections. 
 
Given the mixed possibilities outlined earlier, we advance the following research question regarding 
the relationship between rumor communication on KakaoTalk and campaign participation: 
 
RQ1: How is KakaoTalk rumor communication Wave 1 (W1) associated with political campaign participation 
Wave 2 (W2)? 
 
Rumor Communication and Political Knowledge 
 
The next question is whether rumor communication on KakaoTalk helps citizens learn about politics. 
Many have argued that it is essential for citizens who participate in the political process to be well informed 
(Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). Participation in the absence of political knowledge can be misguided or result 
in outcomes that run counter to the interests of voters (Fowler & Margolis, 2014). Therefore, it is normatively 
desirable for communication that stimulates political participation to also increase political knowledge (Kwak 
et al., 2005). 
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There is reason to predict that the use of KakaoTalk for rumor communication is positively related 
to increased campaign knowledge. Rumors have the potential to encourage information-seeking behavior 
because they occur in situational contexts of ambiguity and uncertainty (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007a). When 
events are unclear and unpredictable, people tend to experience anxiety, which motivates them to scrutinize 
their environment (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000). Given that rumor communication often involves 
uncertainty or anxiety, it follows that encountering rumors could encourage information-searching behavior. 
For example, Weeks and Southwell (2010) found that people were motivated to learn more about political 
topics after hearing rumors about them. Similarly, members of rumor communities respond to uncertainty 
by jointly producing and circulating rumors to give an interpretive frame to a topic and make it more 
predictable (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007a). This inherently involves the exchange of ideas and opinions as people 
attempt to explain and evaluate rumors and to persuade others to believe or disbelieve them (Bordia & 
DiFonzo, 2004). Accordingly, those who take part in the circulation and discussion of rumors are not only 
exposed to the rumor itself, but also likely to encounter a wider range of information and views surrounding 
the rumor topic, which might lead to gains in broader political knowledge. 
 
Despite these reasons to expect a positive relationship between rumor communication and political 
knowledge, there is also evidence supporting the opposite prediction. As we have noted, political rumors 
have the potential to foster cynicism or apathy (Pattie & Johnston, 2001), which may leave citizens 
unmotivated to engage in further information-seeking behavior. Although discussing rumors with others can 
potentially expose people to a wide range of information, the ability to tell facts from false information differs 
from person to person. Because many rumors turn out to be false, they may also lead people down the path 
toward more misinformation. Furthermore, the way people react to rumors is likely to be biased by their 
prior views—they are usually eager to accept attitude-consistent information that lacks a secure standard 
of evidence, and quick to reject well-supported views that challenge their previously held beliefs (i.e., 
motivated reasoning; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Because people are likely to scrutinize political rumors 
discriminately, they may actively search for more information to refute the rumors they disagree with, while 
failing to do so for rumors that reinforce their existing views (Weeks & Garrett, 2014). This may limit their 
ability to learn new information about political candidates. Given the conflicting evidence reviewed earlier, 
we propose the following research question: 
 
RQ2: How is KakaoTalk rumor communication (W1) associated with campaign knowledge (W2)? 
 
The Moderating Role of Political Attitudes 
 
Finally, we address the possibility that the relationships between rumor communication on 
KakaoTalk and campaign participation and knowledge might be moderated by individuals’ preexisting 
political attitudes. This is an important possibility to examine for two reasons—one practical, one theoretical. 
First, a key question in the present study is: For whom might rumor communication be influential? Popular 
narratives surrounding misinformation and political rumors often involve the fear that the politically naïve 
will become misinformed and misguided (e.g., Wallace, 2017). If the politically naïve are indeed more 
vulnerable to rumor effects, rumor discussion could mobilize such disinterested citizens, helping them 
become more motivated and involved in politics. This would present an intriguing and underacknowledged 
upside to rumor communication. On the other hand, it may be that the effects of rumor communication are 
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limited to those with strong existing political attitudes. In this case, it is possible that rumor communication 
actually widens gaps in political participation and knowledge between the segment of the population with 
established political interest and ideology, and everyone else. The answer to this question thus has important 
practical implications for rumor communication within democratic political systems. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, there is ample reason to suspect that the effects of rumor 
communication should be dependent on preexisting political attitudes. A variety of political communication 
studies have demonstrated that those with strong political interest, partisan affiliation, or political ideology 
are more likely to be affected by political media use (Tsfati & Cohen, 2013). This pattern has similarly been 
found in studies of political misinformation, in which individuals with strong partisan affiliations are more 
likely to both engage with and be affected by dubious political content (Guess, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2018; 
Weeks & Garrett, 2014). There is good reason to suspect that political rumors may also be most influential 
among those with established political attitudes. As we have noted, a defining characteristic of political 
rumors is that they are uncertain (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007b). Accordingly, rumors offer prime fuel for 
motivated reasoning, because individuals can resolve uncertainty by adhering to their preexisting views or 
subscribed ideologies (Taber & Lodge, 2006; Weeks & Garrett, 2014). Such partisan-motivated reasoning 
can increase confidence in prior attitudes, which prompts action (Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013). 
This suggests that for rumor communication to bolster participation via opinion reinforcement, individuals 
must have some established political views to begin with. 
 
Will this also apply to the influence of rumors on political knowledge? Because people with 
established political views may employ motivated reasoning to reduce the uncertainty involved in rumor 
communication, they are more likely to focus on partisan cues than on substantive political facts (Druckman 
et al., 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Consequently, rumor communication may do little to stimulate political 
learning among those with established political views. By extension, we could assume that in the absence 
of strong prior attitudes, individuals may be more open to new information, which could encourage learning. 
On the other hand, people without political interest or awareness may lack the motivation to carefully 
scrutinize political information, and therefore uncritically accept whatever rumors they encounter (Zaller, 
1992). In fact, many of the arguments advanced earlier regarding the potential influence of KakaoTalk 
rumor communication on campaign participation and knowledge are dependent on individuals having some 
preexisting level of political interest or ideological affiliation. To test this possibility, we pose the following 
research question: 
 
RQ3: Are the relationships between KakaoTalk rumor communication (W1) and campaign participation (W2) 






To examine our research questions, we used data from an original survey collected during the 2017 
South Korean national election. The survey was administered by the research company YouGov. Using its 
existing pool of South Korean adults, YouGov recruited respondents via strategic partnerships with a wide 
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range of websites and online advertisers. Although this sampling method was nonprobabilistic, a matching 
technique was employed in an attempt to collect a sample that was generally reflective of the population in 
terms of gender, age, and other demographic characteristics. In addition, quotas were set for gender, 
household income, and prefecture. Approximately 20,000 individuals were invited on April 11, a month 
before the 2017 South Korean national election, to participate in W1. A total of 2,040 individuals provided 
complete responses, resulting in a response rate of 10.2%. According to Korean Statistical Information 
Service (KOSIS) census data, this sample was generally reflective of the population in terms of percentage 
of female respondents (W1 = 49.8%, KOSIS = 49.95%). The average education attainment was slightly 
higher in W1, between junior college/other college and university (bachelor’s degree), than in the KOSIS 
census data, roughly equivalent to junior college/other college. The average age was lower in W1 (34.81 
years) than in the KOSIS data (46.82 years). 
 
Invites for W2 were sent on May 3, immediately before the national election on May 9th. A total of 
1,099 respondents from W1 provided valid responses for W2, resulting in a retention rate of 55.9%. The 
final sample (N = 1,099) had an average age of 38.4 (SD = 10.99), a slightly higher percentage of 
respondents who identified as female (54%), a median educational attainment of university (bachelor’s 




KakaoTalk Rumor Communication (Independent Variable) 
 
To tap into rumor communication on KakaoTalk, we asked respondents how often they discussed 
political rumors on the platform. Drawing on previous research, we defined political rumors as pieces of 
political information that are circulated without verification, often outside official media channels (DiFonzo 
& Bordia, 2007b; Weeks & Garrett, 2014). On a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 6 (every day), 
respondents reported how frequently they chatted about “news stories or videos about social issues or 
politics that were not covered in the mass media (일명 찌라시 –so-called Jjirasi).” The term Jjirasi, which was 
included in this question, does not have a direct English translation, but refers to tabloidlike stories or 
information that is not formally verified. Political rumors on social media or instant messaging apps in South 
Korea are often circulated explicitly under this term. Participants who did not use KakaoTalk at all were 
coded as 1 (never). The recoded item was labeled KakaoTalk rumor communication (M = 1.46, SD = 1.04). 
Approximately 20% of the sample reported at least some use of KakaoTalk for rumor communication. We 
also assessed how frequently respondents received (“got”) political rumors on KakaoTalk using similar 
wording and the same 6-point scale: KakaoTalk rumor reception (M = 1.58, SD = 1.15). This variable was 
used as a control. 
 
To validate the KakaoTalk rumor communication measure, we asked respondents whether they 
had read four rumors about different political candidates that were circulated on social media during 2017 
(see rumor text in Supplemental Appendix, available at https://osf.io/g2c9v/). We counted the number of 
rumors that participants recalled seeing, and we labeled the resulting variable rumor recall (M = .71, SD = 
1.15, Min = 0, Max = 4). There was a positive correlation between KakaoTalk rumor communication and 
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rumor recall (r = .29), suggesting that rumor communication on KakaoTalk was positively associated with 
recall of specific rumors. 
 
Campaign Participation (Dependent Variable) 
 
In each wave, respondents reported how frequently in the last 14 days they engaged in a variety 
of activities related to participation in political campaigns, including (1) attending a public hearing, town hall 
meeting, or city council meeting, (2) calling or mailing a public official or politician, (3) physically posting or 
distributing a political sign, banner, button, or bumper sticker, (4) attending a political event for a candidate, 
(5) participating in a political demonstration or protest, (6) volunteering for a political campaign, (7) signing 
a petition about a political issue, topic, or candidate, and (8) donating money to a political party, candidate, 
or political action committee in person or by mail. The following online activities were also included: (9) 
donating money to a political party, candidate, or political action committee online, (10) clicking a link to 
join a political group online, (11) “signing” an online petition about a political issue, topic, or candidate, (12) 
contacting a public official or politician online, and (13) volunteering for a politician or political party online. 
We then counted how many of these activities participants had engaged in at least once during each wave, 
and we labeled the resulting variables campaign participation (W1) (M = .97, SD = 2.56, Min = 0, Max =13, 
α = .94) and campaign participation (W2) (M = .90, SD = 2.46, α = .93), respectively. W1 and W2 campaign 
participation indexes were positively correlated (r = .71). 
 
Campaign Knowledge (Dependent Variable) 
 
To assess participants’ knowledge about the 2017 South Korean presidential election campaign at 
W1, five questions measuring knowledge about political parties and candidates were administered (see Table 
1). We summed the number of knowledge questions participants answered correctly and created a new 
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Table 1. Wave 1 Knowledge Questions. 
Question 
Response Options 
(correct answer in bold) 
Do you happen to know for which party Seungmin Yoo is running 
as a candidate in this presidential election? 
Liberty Korea Party 




Do you happen to know which position the politician Heejung 
Ahn holds? 
Governor of Chungnam 
Governor of Chungbuk 
Governor of Kyungbuk 
Governor of Kangwon 
Governor of Cheonbuk 
Do you happen to know which party the politician Jongin Kim 
recently defect from? 
Liberty Korea Party 




Do you happen to know the name of the politician who recently 







Do you happen to know the name of the presidential candidate 
who has recently been covered in the media regrading whether 






Note. “Don’t know” was provided as an option for each question. 
 
To assess campaign knowledge at W2, when the presidential campaign was in full swing, respondents were 
given a battery of five different questions about policy positions of presidential candidates (Table 2). This 
approach allowed for assessment of how respondents learned new information that emerged during the 
course of the election. Correct answers were summed: campaign knowledge (W2) (M = 2.17, SD = 1.45, 
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Table 2. Wave 2 Knowledge Questions. 
Question Stem: 
“Please answer which candidate supports the following policy 
proposals. Please select ‘I don't know’ if you don't know the answer for 
the questions.” 
Response Options 
(correct answer in bold) 



























Note. Respondents were allowed to select more than one response option or to select “don’t know” and 
were scored as answering correctly only if they selected correct answers. 
† Because of lack of clarity on this candidate’s position on this issue, related responses were excluded from 
knowledge score calculation. 
 
Political Interest and Ideological Strength (Moderators) 
 
To answer RQ3 regarding the moderating influence of political interest and ideological strength, we 
measured both constructs at W1. First, we asked respondents to report their agreement with the statement 
“I am interested in politics” on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): 
political interest (W1) (M = 4.78, SD = 1.5). Next, we asked respondents to describe their political ideology 
on a scale from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative), with a midpoint of 4 (neither liberal nor 
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conservative). This item was “folded” such that individuals at the midpoint were given a 0, and those toward 
either end of scale were given incrementally higher values; those on either extreme were given a 3. This 




Finally, we used several W1 measures to control for demographic characteristics and different forms 
of media use that were likely related to the dependent variables. To control for more general political use 
of KakaoTalk for politics, respondents were asked to report how frequently in the past 14 days they used 
KakaoTalk to get information about social issues and politics. Responses were measured on a 6-point scale 
from 1 (never) to 6 (every day). Those who did not use KakaoTalk were coded as 1 (never), and the resulting 
variable was labeled KakaoTalk for political information (W1) (M = 2.47, SD = 1.99). Traditional news media 
use was assessed by asking respondents to report how often they used the following sources to get 
information about social issues and politics: (1) news program on network TV, (2) news program on cable 
TV, (3) newspaper (print only), and (4) news program on the radio. Items were measured on the same 6-
point frequency scale and combined into a mean index of traditional news use (W1) (M = 2.69, SD = .98, α 
= .69). A similar single item was used to assess the frequency of online news site use: online news use 
(W1) (M = 4.05, SD = 1.22). Using the same 6-point frequency scale, we also controlled for more general 
social media use by asking respondents to report how often they used any social media to stay in touch with 
family and friends. Respondents who did not use social media were coded as 1 (never), and the variable 
was labeled relational social media use (W1) (M = 4.53, SD = 1.7). Age (M = 38.4, SD = 10.99), gender 
(54% female), and education (Mdn = university [bachelor’s degree]) were also included as demographic 





Predictors of Using KakaoTalk For Rumor Communication 
 
To get a better descriptive sense of who uses KakaoTalk for rumor communication, we first 
conducted a cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression predicting KakaoTalk rumor 
communication (W1). In this model, to assess the impact of other predictors above and beyond more general 
use of the platform for politics, we controlled for the degree to which respondents used KakaoTalk to get 
political information. Results reported in Table 3 revealed that more frequent KakaoTalk rumor 
communication was positively associated with political interest (b = .07, SE = .02, p = .001), traditional 
media use (b = .17, SE = .03, p < .001), ideological strength (b = .07, SE = .03, p = .05), and use of 
KakaoTalk for political information (b = .19, SE = .01, p < .001). Social media relational use also emerged 
as a marginally significant predictor (b = .03, SE = .01, p = .054). In contrast, KakaoTalk rumor 
communication was negatively predicted by age (b = −.01, SE = .003, p = .003). These findings suggest 
that use of KakaoTalk for rumor communication is more frequent among the political interested, the 
ideologically extreme, those who use traditional media to get news, social media users, and respondents 
who are younger. 
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Table 3. OLS Regression Predicting KakaoTalk Rumor Communication (W1). 
 Dependent Variable 
 KakaoTalk rumor communication (W1) 
Age (W1) −.01** (.003) 
Gender (Female) (W1) −.08 (.06) 
Education (W1) .02 (.03) 
Political Interest (W1) .07** (.02) 
Ideological Strength (W1) .07* (.03) 
KakaoTalk for Political Information .19*** (.01) 
Traditional News Use (W1) .17*** (.03) 
Online News Use (W1) −.02 (.02) 
Social Media Relational Use (W1) .03# (.02) 
Constant .30 (.22) 
R2 .25 
Adjusted R2 .24 
Residual SE .91 (df = 1089) 
F statistic 39.96*** (df = 9, 1089) 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients and standard errors reported. N = 1,099. 




To test research questions about the relationships between KakaoTalk rumor communication and 
campaign knowledge and participation, we used a series of lagged dependent variable OLS regression 
models. In each model, W1 levels of the dependent variables were included, allowing us to predict 
respondents’ campaign knowledge at W2 while controlling for prior levels (Table 4). KakaoTalk rumor 
communication was a significant positive predictor of campaign participation (b = .22, SE = .08, p = .005; 
Table 4, Column 1), but not of campaign knowledge (b = −.03, SE = .05, p = .63; Table 4, Column 4). 
After controlling for demographic factors, media use, and political attitudes, using KakaoTalk to discuss 
political rumors was associated with more frequent political participation over the course of the campaign, 




1 All models have variance inflation factors of < 3, suggesting that multicollinearity does not substantially 
influence results. 
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Table 4. Lagged Dependent Variable Regression Models Predicting Campaign Knowledge and Participation. 
 Dependent Variable 
 Campaign Participation (W2) Campaign Knowledge (W2) 
KakaoTalk Rumor Communication (W1) .22** (.08) −.43# (.26) .01 (.09) −.03 (.05) .25 (.18) .03 (.07) 
Political Interest (W1) .04 (.04) −.10 (.07) .04 (.04) .14*** (.03) .21*** (.05) .14*** (.03) 
Ideological Strength (W1) .14* (.07) .13* (.07) −.15 (.10) −.03 (.05) −.03 (.05) .04 (.07) 
KakaoTalk for Political Information (W1) −.002 (.03) .0005 (.03) −.0002 (.03) −.03 (.02) −.03 (.02) −.03 (.02) 
Traditional News Use (W1) .23*** (.06) .23*** (.06) .23*** (.06) −.01 (.04) −.01 (.04) −.01 (.04) 
Online News Use (W1) −.01 (.05) −.002 (.05) −.01 (.05) .05# (.03) .05 (.03) .05# (.03) 
Social Media Relational Use (W1) .04 (.03) .04 (.03) .04 (.03) .03 (.02) .03 (.02) .03 (.02) 
Age (W1) −.004 (.01) −.004 (.01) −.004 (.01) .01# (.004) .01# (.004) .01# (.004) 
Gender (Female) (W1) .05 (.11) .05 (.11) .05 (.11) −.02 (.08) −.02 (.08) −.02 (.08) 
Education (W1) .02 (.06) .02 (.06) .02 (.06) .10* (.04) .10* (.04) .10* (.04) 
KakaoTalk Rumor Reception (W1) −.05 (.07) −.06 (.07) −.04 (.07) .02 (.05) .03 (.05) .02 (.05) 
Campaign Knowledge (W1) .01 (.04) .02 (.04) .02 (.04) .44*** (.03) .44*** (.03) .44*** (.03) 
Campaign Participation (W1) .62*** (.02) .61*** (.02) .61*** (.02) −.01 (.02) −.01 (.02) −.01 (.02) 
interaction Terms 
KakaoTalk for Rumors (W1) x Political 
Interest (W1) 
 .11** (.04)   −.05 (.03)  
KakaoTalk for Rumors (W1) x 
Ideological Strength (W1) 
  .19*** (.05)   −.05 (.04) 
Constant −1.02* (.41) −.25 (.50) −.80# (.41) −.97*** (.28) −1.31*** (.35) −1.03*** (.29) 
R2 .53 .53 .53 .35 .35 .35 
Adjusted R2 .52 .52 .53 .34 .34 .34 
Residual SE 1.70 (df = 1085) 1.69 (df = 1084) 1.69 (df = 1084) 1.18 (df = 1085) 1.18 (df = 1084) 1.18 (df = 1084) 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients reported. N = 1099. 
# p <. 1. * p <. 05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Next, we examined whether the relationships between KakaoTalk rumor communication and the 
dependent variables varied across levels of political interest and ideological strength. When campaign 
participation was examined, there was a significant interaction between KakaoTalk rumor communication 
and both political interest (b =.11, SE = .04, p = .01) and ideological strength (b = .19, SE = .05, p < .001; 
Table 4, Columns 2:3). Figures 1 and 2 report Johnson-Neyman plots, which visualize the slope of KakaoTalk 
rumor communication when predicting campaign participation at different levels of political interest and 
ideological strength. KakaoTalk rumor communication is a positive predictor of campaign participation only 
among those with higher levels of political interest—approximately 5.2 and higher on the 7-point scale. This 
suggests that for those who are at least moderately interested in politics, the use of KakaoTalk to discuss 
rumors is associated with increased campaign participation. Figure 2 demonstrates a similar pattern in which 
KakaoTalk rumor communication is a positive predictor of campaign participation only for individuals with 
some minimal attachment to a political ideology, but not for individuals who described themselves as 
“neither liberal nor conservative.” When predicting campaign knowledge, there was no significant interaction 
between KakaoTalk rumor communication and political interest (b = −.05, SE = .03, p = .10) or ideological 
strength (b = −.05, SE = .04, p = .19; Table 4, Columns 5—6). 
 
 
Figure 1. Johnson-Neyman plot of relationship between KakaoTalk rumor communication and 
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Figure 2. Johnson-Neyman plot of relationship between KakaoTalk rumor communication and 
campaign participation across levels of ideological strength. 
 
Considering a “Multi-Causal Inventory” 
 
Although panel data provide significant advantages over cross-sectional data, these data still limit 
our ability to draw causal conclusions and to rule out alternative explanations. Following the guidance of 
Margolin (2019), we sought to complement our preferred casual explanation by considering a “multi-causal 
inventory” (p. 238), which included other causal possibilities that our data allow us to examine. Our primary 
analyses found evidence consistent with a positive causal relationship between KakaoTalk rumor 
communication and increased campaign participation between waves. In addition, we considered (a) 
whether this relationship might actually be caused by baseline levels of political interest or ideological 
strength, or (b) whether the causal direction might be reversed. We stress that these possibilities would be 
best evaluated using more than two waves of data that allow for more sophisticated longitudinal analysis. 
In the absence of such data, we replicated our primary analyses using a cross-lagged path model (see Figure 
A1 in Supplemental Appendix, available at https://osf.io/g2c9v/). W1 levels of KakaoTalk rumor 
communication, campaign participation, campaign knowledge, political interest, and ideological strength 
predicted W2 levels of these variables, while including the controls used in previous models (see Figure A1, 
Supplemental Appendix, available at https://osf.io/g2c9v/). These results largely replicate those reported 
in Table 4. The relationship between KakaoTalk rumor communication (W1) and campaign participation and 
knowledge (W2) remained the same when cross-lagged paths for political interest and ideological strength 
were included. Further, neither W1 political interest nor ideological strength predicted W2 rumor 
communication (ps > .05). This did not offer evidence that we are simply observing political interest and 
ideological strength driving KakaoTalk rumor communication and campaign participation simultaneously. 
However, we did find evidence of reverse causality: W1 campaign participation was a significant positive 
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engagement in politics might be a causal driver of rumor communication, a conclusion that is consistent 




Recent research has highlighted the dangerous consequences of new communication technologies 
that increase the speed and reach of political rumors (Garrett, 2011; Sunstein, 2014; Weeks & Garrett, 
2014). Findings from the present study suggest that rumor communication on instant messaging platforms 
such as KakaoTalk can also affect the more fundamental ways citizens engage in politics. The relationships 
we identify suggest that rumor communication on instant messaging platforms might asymmetrically boost 
political participation without increasing political knowledge and ultimately exacerbate existing participatory 
inequality between those with weak and strong political attitudes. 
 
First, we found that the use of KakaoTalk rumor communication was positively associated with 
increased campaign participation. This reflects the well-established ability of rumors to affect behavior 
(DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007b; Weeks & Garrett, 2014) and suggests that rumor communication on the app 
may have reinforced individuals’ existing political views and identities, which in turn facilitated more 
substantive political engagement. Although this indicates that rumor communication is similar to other forms 
of political talk in its ability to catalyze political participation (Kwak et al., 2005), it also may reflect the 
unique social function that rumors can play (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007b; Edy & Risley-Baird, 2016). By 
discussing rumors on KakaoTalk, participants may have created or solidified politically like-minded networks 
(i.e., rumor communities), which can be crucial for motivating people to engage in politics (Mutz, 2002). On 
a theoretical level, this finding supports the potential for rumor communication to motivate political behavior. 
Given the nature of our data, we can only speculate on the potential mechanisms at work. Future studies 
should explore such mechanisms using multiple waves of data. 
 
While using KakaoTalk to discuss rumors may have encouraged participation in the 2017 South 
Korean presidential election, we found little evidence that this improved participants’ knowledge about the 
candidates. On the one hand, this may be expected, given that rumor communication itself does not entail 
direct exposure to the type of campaign knowledge assessed by our knowledge measures. However, as we 
suggested in the introduction, rumor communication could have stimulated information seeking, which could 
have, in turn, led to gains in political knowledge. Ultimately, we failed to find evidence that this was the case. 
This is troubling, given that in multiparty political systems such as South Korea’s, understanding the 
candidates’ policy positions is important for guiding participatory behavior and vote choice (Delli Carpini & 
Keeter, 1996). As Fowler and Margolis (2014) demonstrated, those who are less politically informed cast votes 
that are systematically misaligned with their interests. If rumor communication on KakaoTalk motivates people 
to participate without leaving them more knowledgeable, the resulting participatory behavior may not 
necessarily be aligned with their best interests. Our findings indicate a problematic asymmetry, given the 
normative expectation that those who participate more should also be better informed. 
 
Further, we found evidence that the effects of using KakaoTalk for rumor communication may be 
confined to those with higher levels of political interest and stronger political ideologies. In fact, among 
those with little interest in politics or weak ideological preferences, KakaoTalk rumor communication had no 
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significant relationship with political participation. Our supplementary analysis found that those who were 
politically engaged at W1 were more likely to discuss rumors on KakaoTalk in the first place. Consistent with 
past research, this indicates that it is those with already developed political attitudes who are likely to be 
affected by rumors (Weeks & Garrett, 2014). Unfortunately, this suggests that the use of KakaoTalk for 
rumor communication may further widen gaps in participation. Rumors may push those who are already 
predisposed to engage in politics to participate more by stirring their emotions, stimulating political 
solidarity, or motivating them to protect others from what they perceive as harmful points of view. Yet, 
rumor communication does not appear to equip those with strong political attitudes with any additional 
political knowledge that might help them make more informed participatory choices. 
 
Ultimately, the present study illustrates that instant messaging apps have expanded the 
possibilities for political rumor communication. The features of these platforms allow people to discuss 
rumors with their close contacts within the safety of closed networks. The ability of these platforms to 
facilitate asynchronous communication among small groups across long distances constitutes further 
advantages over face-to-face rumor communication. Given the global ubiquity of these platforms, studying 
rumor communication on instant messaging platforms such as WeChat and WhatsApp is an important task 
for future research. In addition to offering initial empirical evidence that talking about rumors on these 
platforms can have broader consequences for democratic life, we hope this study offers a theoretical entry 
point for future research in this area. 
 
Although this study makes several important contributions to the study of political rumors on social 
media, we note several limitations. First, we examined a specific communication technology in a specific 
national context. Future studies should attempt to replicate our findings on other platforms and in other 
contexts to determine the generalizability of the relationships we observe. We do, however, consider the 
use of data from the South Korean election an advantage, given that the majority of political communication 
research continues to be conducted in North America or Europe. Our findings offer insight into the potential 
effects of rumors in one of the most technologically advanced democracies. Second, our measures of rumor 
communication on KakaoTalk rely on self-reports, and we are therefore unable to assess the valence, topic, 
or nature of rumor communication. Despite evidence supporting the validity of self-reported social media 
use (Guess, Munger, Nagler, & Tucker, 2019), future studies should attempt to more precisely capture 
nuances in rumor communication to clarify the role of rumor content and social networks. Relatedly, we 
cannot preclude omitted variable bias or alternative causal explanations. Although we believe our models 
are well controlled, we have also endeavored to discuss a range of causal possibilities in an effort to make 
our results more portable (see Margolin, 2019). Finally, recent research has highlighted issues with the 
measurement of political knowledge (Strabac & Aalberg, 2011). More sophisticated and extensive measures 
of political knowledge should be employed to strengthen our findings. Future research might also consider 




Rumors will endure as an important way in which citizens make collective sense of politics (Edy & 
Risley-Baird, 2016). As discussion of political rumors on social media becomes a common feature of political 
life, it is vital to consider not only the way this form of political communication fuels misperceptions, but also 
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how it shapes engagement in the political process. Our findings illustrate that the contexts for rumor 
communication created by instant messaging platforms such as KakaoTalk have the potential to widen the 
participatory gap between those with strong political attitudes and everyone else. Further, such gains in 
participation do not appear to be accompanied by a commensurate boost in political knowledge. What are the 
implications for societies in which those at the ideological extremes are motivated to participate in politics, but 
no better informed? As Mason (2018) argued, the tendency to view all participation as normatively desirable 
misses the reality that engagement born out of competition between ideological or partisan groups can be 
unhealthy for political systems. The real concern is that political rumor communication on social media might 
fuel what Mason (2018) terms “activism for the wrong reasons” (p. 102). Future research should continue to 
explore this and other possibilities to clarify how new communication technologies are amplifying or changing 
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